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Abstract
A new general-equilibrium model that links together rural-to-urban migration, the 
externality effect of the average level of human capital, and agglomeration economies 
shows that in developing countries, unrestricted rural-to-urban migration reduces the 
average income of both rural and urban dwellers in equilibrium. Various measures aimed 
at curtailing rural-to-urban migration by unskilled workers can lead to a Pareto 
improvement for both the urban and rural dwellers. In addition, the government can raise
social welfare by reducing the migration of skilled workers to the city. Moreover, without 
a restriction on rural-to-urban migration, a government’s efforts to increase educational 
expenditure and thereby the number of skilled workers may not increase wage rates in the
rural or urban areas. 
Keywords: Rural-to-urban migration; The externality effect of the average level of human 
capital; Agglomeration economies; Public policies
JEL Classification: B12; H21; O15; O18; R13; R23
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1. Introduction
In this paper, a new model of rural-to-urban migration is developed, with an 
emphasis on the role of human capital in both urban and rural economic activities. 
Notable exceptions notwithstanding, a substantial literature on rural-to-urban migration
has taken its cue from the dual economy model of Harris and Todaro (1970). Their model 
assumes that the urban sector produces manufactured goods using (homogeneous) labor 
and physical capital as factors of production, and that the rural sector produces 
agricultural goods using (homogeneous) labor and land as factors of production. The 
model has been widely used as a basic analytical framework for studying rural-to-urban 
migration in developing countries and as a platform for policy formation.
However, since the Harris and Todaro model ignores human capital as a factor of 
production, it appears to have become increasingly less applicable to many developing 
countries in modern times. For example, due to continuing structural changes in recent 
decades, cities in the developing world have become more oriented toward service and 
(relatively) high-tech industries. Also, with a growing share of manufactured goods 
becoming standardized, these goods can be produced anywhere that offers basic 
infrastructure such as piped water and reliable electricity. Consequently, the production 
of manufactured goods increasingly takes place in the rural areas of developing 
countries.1 This realignment enhances the importance of human capital in the rural areas.
For example, Taylor and Yunez-Naude (2000) find that in rural Mexico, the returns from 
schooling are high both in crop and noncrop activities; as schooling levels increase, the 
returns from schooling arise from activities other than crop production. In China, the 
township and village enterprises (TVEs) have played a significant role in the country’s
economic growth since the early eighties. In 2000, for example, TVEs accounted for 47 
percent of the total industrial output in China (Fu and Balasubramanyam 2003), and the 
output value of TVEs has been far greater than the output value of agriculture. Yang and 
An (2002), and Yang (2004) show that education not only increases productivity in the 
                                                
1 For surveys on the importance in recent decades of the rural non-farm sector for the economies of 
developing countries see Lanjouw and Lanjouw (2001) and Reardon et al. (2001).
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nonagricultural sector in rural China, but that it also facilitates and encourages the 
relocation of productive inputs from agricultural to nonagricultural pursuits. Jonasson
(2007) finds that in rural Peru, nonagricultural rural employment is a prerequisite for 
positive returns to education, and that education is rewarded by rural-based
nonagricultural work. A perception that the rural areas in developing countries are an 
exclusive domain of uneducated peasants who apply physical labor to eke out a living 
had better be discarded.
In this paper we develop a new policy-yielding model of migration in which 
human capital is important in both the urban and rural areas. In line with considerable
research in urban economics and economic growth, agglomeration economies in the cities
are built into the model. 2 In a simple general-equilibrium framework, our model
interlinks three key factors: the process of migration from the rural area to the urban area,
the externality effect of the average level of human capital, and agglomeration
economies.3
We postulate that a city’s productivity is determined by its average level of
human capital and by the size of its labor force. The productivity of the rural area is 
determined by its average level of human capital. Right at the outset, the analysis yields a 
rather surprising implication: in developing countries, unrestricted rural-to-urban 
migration reduces the average income of both rural and urban dwellers in equilibrium. 
This result implies that although a city attracts all the skilled individuals and enjoys the
benefit of agglomeration economies (which the rural areas do not), with free labor 
                                                
2  Several interesting studies that incorporate agglomeration economies into models of rural-to-urban 
migration (for example, the survey by Abdel-Rahman and Anas 2004) tend to abstract from the unique 
characteristics of developing countries.
3 The agglomeration economies of a city have been studied extensively in the urban economics literature
and, lately, in the economic growth literature (Black and Henderson 1999a and 1999b, Henderson 2003). 
There is also a growing awareness of late of the importance of the (positive) externality effect of the 
average level of human capital for a city’s productivity (Black and Henderson 1999b, Lucas 2001, Glaeser 
and Saiz 2004, Moretti 2004). However, to the best of our knowledge, no attempt has been made thus far to
examine systematically the combined repercussions of rural-to-urban migration, human capital spillovers, 
and agglomeration effects. Shukla and Stark (1990) analyze several policy implications of agglomeration 
economies in the city for rural-to-urban migration. They assume homogeneous workers and do not attend to 
human capital considerations. Bertinelli and Black (2004) investigate a model of rural-to-urban migration 
with congestion costs in the city. They abstract from the consideration of agglomeration economies and the 
contemporaneous externality effect of the average level of human capital.
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mobility, the city’s productivity is still very low in equilibrium. The intuition underlying
this result is quite simple: since the returns to skills are higher in the urban areas than in 
the rural areas, as is typically the case in developing countries, skilled workers are likely 
to concentrate in the cities. Consequently, the wage rate of the unskilled workers in the 
rural areas will be low, which in turn will induce a large number of unskilled rural 
workers to leave for the cities. With free labor mobility, the rural-to-urban migration 
process will come to a halt when the urban and rural wages for unskilled workers are 
equalized: the urban wage will decline continuously with the in-migration of unskilled 
workers which, in turn, will reduce the average level of human capital in the city. In other 
words, unrestricted rural-to-urban migration results in a lower wage for unskilled workers 
in both the urban and rural areas. Furthermore, since the wages of skilled and unskilled 
workers in the urban area are affected by common productivity factors, the wage for the
skilled workers will be driven to a low level by the unrestricted rural-to-urban migration. 
Thus, our model explains the negative consequences of rural-to-urban migration in the
developing world, as is amply highlighted, for example, in nearly every leading 
development economics textbook (cf. Gillis et al. 1996, Ray 1998, Todaro 2000).4
In essence, our results arise from the difference between the private human capital 
and the social returns to human capital, a difference that implies that free labor mobility
leads to an equilibrium that is not socially optimal. In all countries in general, and in
developing countries in particular, there is an urban-rural wage gap for educated 
workers.5 Consequently, with free movement of labor, all skilled workers will cluster in 
the urban area, leaving the rural area with an average level of human capital that is below 
the social optimum. 
Our analysis yields several interesting policy insights. First, our model shows that 
various measures aimed at curtailing rural-to-urban migration by unskilled workers, 
which include subsidizing the rural sector and restricting rural-to-urban migration,6 can 
                                                
4 Moreover, our model applies not only to migration from rural areas to urban areas, but also to migration 
from towns and counties to cities, or even from small cities to large cities.
5 For example, see McCormick and Wahba (2005) and Naughton (2007).
6 The policy of restricting rural-to-urban migration has been implemented by a number of developing 
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lead to a Pareto improvement for both urban and rural dwellers. Second, and somewhat 
surprisingly, our analysis shows that the government can raise social welfare by reducing 
the migration of skilled workers into the city and by subsidizing some skilled workers to 
move from the city to the rural areas or, for that matter, to stay in the rural areas. Third, 
our model shows that in developing countries, when there is nothing to deter rural-to-
urban migration, a government’s effort to increase educational expenditures and thereby
the number of skilled workers may not increase the wage rates in rural or urban areas as 
long as there are still a large number of unskilled workers in the rural area in equilibrium. 
In fact, a rather perplexing result is that as the number of skilled workers (in the city) 
increases, the average level of human capital in the city may very well decrease.
2. The basic analytical framework
In what follows we develop a quite simple model in order to highlight our 
essential ideas. A detailed discussion of the robustness of the model is provided in 
Section 5. 
Consider a small open economy that consists of an urban area (the city) and a 
rural area (the countryside). There are two types of workers: skilled and unskilled.
Efficiency labor is the only factor of production in both the city and the countryside. The 
labor markets in the city and in the countryside are both perfectly competitive. The urban 
sector produces a single good, and the rural sector produces a different single good. The 
aggregate production in the city is according to a constant returns to scale production 
technology
FnY c  (1)
where cY and n are the total output and the sum total of the efficiency units of labor 
employed in the city, respectively. Akin to Black and Henderson (1999b), we assume that 
                                                                                                                                                
countries and, as noted in Section 3 below, is exemplified by the “Hukou” system in China that strictly 
restricts rural-to-urban migration (Au and Henderson 2006).
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F, the productivity factor of the city, is determined by n, the agglomeration effect of the 
city, and by the city’s fraction of skilled labor (the number of skilled workers in the city
divided by the total number of workers in the city), which is denoted by ch . Namely, we 
define
),( chnfF  .
We assume that
,0),(
),(
1 
 cc hnf
n
hnf
   0),(
),(
2 
 c
c
c
hnf
h
hnf
 . (2)
The assumption 0),(1 chnf  means that there is an agglomeration effect in the 
production in the city. This is a standard assumption in urban and regional economics 
(see, for example, Black and Henderson 1999a, Henderson 2003). The assumption 
0),(2 chnf  means that the production efficiency of the city depends positively on the 
average level of human capital of the city; that is, there is a positive externality effect of 
the average level of human capital (see, for example, Acemoglu 1996, Black and 
Henderson 1999b, Lucas 2001, Glaeser and Saiz 2004, Moretti 2004, Liu 2007).
Since the economy is small and open, the prices of its outputs are determined in
the world market and are thus independent of the economy’s outputs. We normalize the 
price of the good produced in the urban sector of the economy to one. Since the labor 
market in the city is perfectly competitive, the wage rate per efficiency unit of labor in 
the city is equal to the marginal product of efficiency labor in the city, namely to
),( chnf .
We assume that an unskilled worker is endowed with one unit of efficiency labor. 
Skilled workers are assumed to be homogeneous. We also assume that the private returns
to human capital are higher (or at least marginally higher) in the city than in the 
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countryside.7 Accordingly, we assume that a skilled worker is endowed with  units of 
efficiency labor if he works in the city, and with  units of efficiency labor if he works in 
the countryside, and that
1   . (3)
Thus, in the urban area, the earnings of an unskilled worker and the earnings of a skilled 
worker are ),( chnf  and ),( chnf , respectively.
The aggregate production in the rural sector is according to a constant returns to
scale production technology
rr HLY  (4)
where rY  and rL  are the total output and the sum total of the efficiency units of labor 
employed in the countryside, respectively. In line with the discussion in the Introduction, 
we assume that H, the productivity factor of the rural sector, is determined by the fraction 
of skilled workers in the rural area8, which is denoted by rh .9 Namely, we define
)(
1 rhg
P
H 
where P is a positive coefficient, and where we assume that 0)(' rhg . Thus, the 
average level of human capital is a production factor in both the rural area and the urban 
                                                
7This assumption is in line with the evidence (see, for example, Schultz 2004and Naughton 2007) and is 
consistent with the presumption that the returns to an individual’s skills are positively affected by the 
average level of human capital. In fact, in the related theoretical literature such as Bertinelli and Black 
(2004) and Lucas (2004), an extreme assumption is made that the returns to human capital in the rural area 
are zero.
8 That the wage of an unskilled worker increases with the proportion of skilled workers in the rural area can 
be attributed to the complementarity between skilled and unskilled labor in the rural area, as well as to the 
externality effect of the average level of human capital.
9 That the wage of an unskilled worker increases with the proportion of skilled workers in the rural area can 
be attributed to the complementarity between skilled and unskilled labor in the rural area, as well as to the 
externality effect of the average level of human capital.
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area, although the private returns to human capital may well be greater in the city than in 
the countryside. However, in line with the received literature, we assume that the 
agglomeration effect exists only in the urban area.
We assume that the price of the good produced in the rural sector is P. Then, the 
value of the marginal product of an efficiency unit of labor in the rural area is )( rhg . 
Since the labor market in the rural area is perfectly competitive, the wage rate per 
efficiency unit of labor in the countryside is equal to )( rhg . Thus, in the rural area, the 
earnings of an unskilled worker (that is, the wage for his efficiency unit of labor) and the 
earnings of a skilled labor are )( rhg and )( rhg , respectively.
Finally, we assume that all individuals supply their efficiency units of labor 
inelastically. Then, since prices are constant, the indirect utility function of every 
individual is his income. Thus, in this paper we assume that every individual seeks to 
maximize his income.
Consider now unhindered rural-to-urban migration. To concentrate on essentials, 
for most of this paper we do not consider the process of human capital formation, taking 
the numbers of skilled and unskilled workers as exogenously given. (This assumption is 
relaxed, however, in Section 4.2.) We introduce the following notations:
cs : the number of skilled workers in the city before migration occurs
cl : the number of unskilled workers in the city before migration occurs
rs : the number of skilled workers in the rural area before migration occurs
rl : the number of unskilled workers in the rural area before migration occurs
sm : the number of skilled migrants
lm : the number of unskilled migrants
We first examine the equilibrium conditions when there are no restrictions on 
rural-to-urban migration. The rural-to-urban migration of the unskilled workers ceases if 
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and only if the rural wage and the urban wage for unskilled workers are equalized, as 
long as there are unskilled workers in the rural area in equilibrium. That is, if the solution 
is interior, then the number of unskilled migrants, lm , will be determined by the 
following equation:
)(),( rc hghnf   . (5)
From the assumptions in (3), we know that the wages for a skilled labor in the city and in 
the countryside are ),( chnf  and )( rhg , respectively. From (5) and the assumptions in 
(3), we know that
)()(),( rrc hghghnf   , (6)
which implies that if there is rural-to-urban migration of both unskilled and skilled 
workers, then all skilled workers will end up in the city, which in turn implies that 
0rh . Thus, we can rewrite (5) as 
)0(],)([ g
mssl
ss
msslf
lrcc
rc
lrcc 
 . (7)
As an added comment, note that we assume that the following condition is satisfied so 
that not all unskilled workers migrate to the city in equilibrium: 
)0(],)([ g
lssl
ss
lsslf
rrcc
rc
rrcc 
 . (8)
Since the solution is interior, we must have that rl lm  . Then, clearly, we have the 
following proposition.
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Proposition 1: Without restrictions on rural-to-urban migration, the wage rates for 
unskilled workers and for skilled workers are, respectively, )0(g and )0(g in 
equilibrium.
Note that )0(g is the lowest possible wage for unskilled workers, and )0(g is the 
lowest possible wage for skilled workers in the urban area. Thus, Proposition 1 implies 
that no matter how strong the agglomeration effect in the urban area, if the city cannot 
absorb all the unskilled workers from the rural area, which is typically the case in the 
developing world, then everyone will end up being poor. In other words, without any 
restrictions on, or barriers to, rural-to-urban migration, the agglomeration effect can result 
in high production efficiency only in a partial equilibrium framework. However, our 
general equilibrium framework, as simple as it is, shows that the efficiency effect of 
urban agglomeration can be completely diluted by the falling level of average human 
capital in the city resulting from the rural-to-urban migration of unskilled workers. As 
noted in the introduction, this inefficient outcome stems from the misallocation of the 
externality effect of human capital between the rural and urban areas and from the 
inability of a free market regime to yield efficient outcomes when the externality effect of
the average level of human capital is important in production. This result provides an 
explanation for the empirical observation that urbanization per se may not lead to 
efficiency gains despite the benefit of agglomeration economies in the cities of the 
developing countries (Gillis et al. 1996, Todaro 2000, Henderson 2003).
3. Restricting rural-to-urban migration can improve social welfare
The market failure identified in Section 2 suggests that the government should
assume a role in managing the rural-to-urban movement of labor. In this section, we will 
demonstrate that by restricting rural-to-urban migration in various ways, the government 
can improve social welfare.
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3.1. Restrictions placed on the migration of the unskilled
In this subsection, we consider only a restriction on the migration of unskilled 
workers. In such a case, all the skilled workers will be in the city. We assume that the 
government chooses lm  to maximize the output of the entire economy; that is,
)0()(],)([])([ gml
mssl
ss
msslfmssl lr
lrcc
rc
lrcclrcc 
  . (9)
Since the objective function in (9) is continuous with respect to lm , which in turn 
belongs to the compact set [0, rl ], an optimal solution of lm must exist. Let the optimal 
solution to (9) be denoted by *m . From the assumption in (8), we know that *m < rl . 
Then, if the government can restrict migration by allowing only *m  unskilled rural 
workers into the city, then the urban wage will increase.10 As to the rural unskilled 
workers, their wage rate will still be at the level of g(0), which is their equilibrium wage 
rate without any restrictions on rural-to-urban migration. Thus, a restriction of rural-to-
urban migration can lead to a Pareto improvement.
In summary, we thus have the following proposition.
Proposition 2: The restriction of rural-to-urban migration of unskilled workers can 
result in a Pareto improvement.
Proposition 2 implies that from the perspective of production efficiency in the 
economy at large, absent restrictions on rural-to-urban migration there are too many 
unskilled migrants. The Proposition provides a rationale for the policies of restricting 
rural-to-urban migration of unskilled workers that have been implemented by a number 
                                                
10 Intuitively, we may consider the following scenario: suppose that prior to the incidence of rural-to-urban 
migration, the urban wage (for unskilled workers) is higher than the rural wage. If the government can 
impose a restriction that only skilled workers can migrate from the countryside to the city, then the urban 
wage will increase because the migration of the skilled workers into the city will enhance the 
agglomeration effect and raise the average level of human capital in the city. 
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of developing countries including Indonesia, the Philippines, Tanzania, and in particular, 
China.11
In China, a policy called the Hukou system is in effect. Essentially, this is a 
household registration system. In a way, Hukou is akin to a citizenship in the context of 
international migration: it entitles an individual to free or subsidized housing, medical 
care, children’s education, and other social benefits, but only in a certain specific 
location. Hukou is an effective tool for restricting rural-to-urban migration, particularly 
of unskilled workers (see, for example, Chan and Zhang 1999, Wu and Treiman 2004, Au 
and Henderson 2006). In particular, it is costly for rural individuals to migrate to the 
cities. For example, Au and Henderson (pp. 352-353) write, “Permanently leaving a 
village means abandoning ownership claims without compensation to agricultural land 
that one’s family may have farmed for decades and to the profits of local rural industries 
which are distributed in-kind, as for example with township housing. …Migrants may 
still have to pay taxes to their rural home village for services they don’t consume and on 
land left fallow. …There is a license fee to work outside the home township paid to the 
township that can be equivalent to several months’ wages. At the destination there can be 
fees for city management, for being a “foreign” worker, for city construction, for crime 
fighting, for temporary residence, and even for family planning if the migrant is female.” 
Proposition 2 suggests an economic rationale for the Hukou system in China. 
Massive rural-to-urban migration will significantly drive down the average human capital 
in the cities, although it enhances the agglomeration economies of the cities. Without any 
restrictions on rural-to-urban migration, the net effect is negative and urban productivity 
will be driven to a low level. The Hukou system may not though necessarily lead to an
optimal production efficiency in the cities, yet it enhances urban production efficiency by 
more than free rural-to-urban migration would. Thus, although the Hukou system was 
largely an outgrowth of political considerations, our model shows that it may have 
significant and surprisingly positive economic benefits.
                                                
11 However, a policy of restricting rural-to-urban migration of only unskilled individuals will result in a 
large urban-rural gap in earnings. Apparently, efficiency and equality do not move in tandem.
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3.2. Restrictions placed on the migration of the skilled 
This subsection shows that if some skilled workers can be held back in the rural 
area (albeit with some financial compensation from the government), then, obviously, the 
proportion of skilled workers in the rural area will be greater than zero, which implies 
that there will be an overall increase in the wage rate and, hence, a possible enhancement 
of social welfare.
To establish this possibility rigorously, we denote the proportion of the skilled 
workers that are kept in the rural area by x. Then, with free migration of rural unskilled 
workers, the wage rate for unskilled and skilled workers in the countryside will be, 
respectively, g(x) and g(x) in equilibrium; the wage rate for unskilled and skilled 
workers in the city will be, respectively, g(x) and g(x) in equilibrium. Thus, total output 
(in the economy at large) will be
)()]()([ xgmsmsll srscrc   . (10)
It is subject to 
lrsr
sr
mlms
ms
x

 (11)
and
)(],)([ xg
mmsl
ms
mmslf
lscc
sc
lscc 

 . (12)
The first order condition of (10) with respect to x is 
0)(')]()([)(
)(
)(  xgmsmsllxg
dx
md srscrc
s
 (13)
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with strict equality holding if 0x . In (13), the expression of 
dx
md s )(
 can be obtained by 
totally differentiating (11) and (12) with respect to sm , lm  and x. It is easy to verify that 
if )0('g is sufficiently large, then x=0 cannot satisfy (13), which means that x=0 is not 
the optimal solution. 
The preceding discussion leads then to the following proposition.
Proposition 3: If )0('g is sufficiently large, then total output will be larger if some skilled 
workers work in the rural area.
Proposition 3 implies that if the cost of tax and transfer that the government incurs 
is sufficiently small relative to )0('g which is the marginal benefit of increasing the 
average level of human capital in the rural area when the level is at zero, then the 
(benevolent) government will find it beneficial to induce some skilled individuals to work 
in the rural area by means of financial compensation. Since human capital is increasingly 
important in the rural areas of many developing countries, when the initial level of
average human capital is low, the increase in output resulting from some skilled 
individuals working in the rural area will be large, which implies that this condition is 
likely to be satisfied in these countries. Thus, an interesting policy implication is that a 
Pareto improvement can be had if the government were to subsidize some skilled labor in 
the rural areas so that they will not migrate to the city or that they will move from the city 
to the rural areas. 12 The presence of a certain number of skilled workers in the rural areas 
may significantly reduce the rural-to-urban migration of unskilled workers.
                                                
12 For the United States, an analysis based on data taken from the National Longitudinal Survey of the 
Labor Market Experience 1979 until 1998 (Gould 2007) suggests that for “white-collar” workers, human 
capital gains acquired from working in the city are transferable to the rural areas. There is no evidence that 
moving to the rural areas wipes out the usefulness of human capital even if acquired in the city. Of course 
the United States’ evidence may be of limited relevance to the setting that we have studied, but it serves to 
hint that a “downward” movement from the city to the rural area is not a harbinger of inevitable human 
capital erosion.
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Proposition 3 further implies that without restrictions on migration, there may be 
too many skilled migrants.13 The intuition is that the migration of skilled workers from 
the rural areas is likely to bring in its wake the migration of many more unskilled 
workers, which will reduce the average human capital of the city, and hence the city’s 
productivity.14 The migration of skilled workers from the rural areas will reduce rural 
productivity, which will make the rural areas even less attractive to rural unskilled
workers. Consequently, the migration of skilled workers can lead to a large number of 
unskilled workers migrating from the rural areas. The common wisdom in the received 
literature is that in developing countries, while unskilled rural-to-urban migration may 
harm the urban economy, skilled rural-to-urban migration will have a positive effect on 
the urban economy (for example, see McCormick and Wahba). The common wisdom is
deficient because it is based on a partial-equilibrium analysis, concentrating on the 
beneficial impact of skilled rural-to-urban migration for the cities, while ignoring both
the harmful impact of this migration for the rural areas and the harmful impact for cities 
of the subsequent unskilled rural-to-urban migration. Our general-equilibrium analysis 
implies that excessive skilled rural-to-urban migration harms the urban economy as well.
Again, the Hukou system in China provides a good case study of the benefits of 
restricting rural-to-urban migration in a developing country.15 A fairly unique feature of 
the Chinese economy is its township and village enterprises (TVEs), which, as already 
noted in the Introduction, have played a significant role in China’s growth since the early 
eighties. An important contributing factor for the rapid development of TVEs is the
plentiful presence of talented and skilled workers in China’s rural areas (Fu and 
                                                
13 In this model, we abstract from the consideration that individuals may have idiosyncratic tastes for living 
in the countryside or in the city. With this additional consideration, whether the implication holds will 
depend on whether there are a sufficiently large number of skilled individuals who prefer to live in the 
countryside due to their idiosyncratic tastes despite the urban-rural skilled wage gap.
14 It might be argued that if there are few skilled individuals in the countryside, then the (private) returns to 
the skilled in the countryside will be high, but this argument is not supported by evidence. In most 
developing countries, or even developed countries, there is a much larger fraction of skilled workers in the 
city. However, the private returns (the earnings) of the skilled are much higher in the cities. In fact, it 
appears that the less skilled there are in the countryside, the larger the urban-rural gap and the less the 
earnings of both the skilled and the unskilled in the countryside.
15  The Hukou system imposes much less stringent migration restrictions on skilled workers than on 
unskilled workers (Wu and Treiman). Still, there are significant barriers even for a skilled worker in rural 
China to obtain an urban Hukou. Consequently, many skilled workers remain in the rural areas of China.
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Balasubramanyam). Conversely, the development of rural industries dampens the 
incentive of skilled workers to migrate from the rural to the urban areas.
4. Additional policy implications
In this section, we analyze the implications of two policies that have often been 
implemented in many developing countries: (1) subsidy to the rural sector, and (2) 
increasing educational expenditures. We assume that labor is freely mobile between the 
rural and the urban areas, that is, that no restrictions are imposed on rural-to-urban 
migration.
4.1. Subsidy to the rural sector 
We denote the subsidy to every worker in the rural sector by . Then, from
Proposition 1, the net wage rate of every unit of efficiency labor in the rural area will rise 
from g(0) to g(0)+. We postulate that the subsidy is financed by taxing the workers in 
the city, and we assume that the tax rate is flat. Then, in equilibrium, the following two 
conditions must be satisfied.
(1) Urban-rural wage equalization
With free labor mobility and perfectly-competitive labor markets, the urban wage 
rate for the unskilled workers must be equal to the rural wage rate for the unskilled 
workers so that there is no further rural-to-urban migration. By logic similar to the 
reasoning of Section 2, all skilled individuals work in the city in equilibrium. Thus, with 
government intervention of tax and subsidy, the equilibrium condition for the 
equalization of the (net) wage rate in the rural and urban areas is
 
 )0(],)([)1( g
mssl
ss
msslf
lrcc
rc
lrcc (14)
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where  denotes the tax rate (per an efficiency of unit labor in the city).
(2) The government’s budget constraint
Since we study a static model, we assume that the government’s budget must be 
balanced: the total subsidy payments to the rural sector are equal to the total tax revenue 
in the urban sector; that is, 
 )(],)([])([ lr
lrcc
rc
lrcclrcc ml
mssl
ss
msslfmssl 
 . (15)
We now show that the subsidy to the rural sector can lead to a Pareto 
improvement for both urban and rural dwellers. The reasoning is straightforward: with 
the subsidy in place, the net wage rate (that is, the wage rate after the tax and subsidy) for 
the unskilled workers in both the urban sector and the rural sector in equilibrium will 
increase from g(0) to g(0)+. Meanwhile, in equilibrium, the net wage rate for the skilled 
workers (in the urban sector) will increase from g(0) to [g(0)+]. Thus, the subsidy to 
the rural sector can lead to a strict Pareto improvement for both urban and rural dwellers, 
which unambiguously improves social welfare.
Next, we examine how the subsidy to the rural sector can be optimally chosen. 
We assume that the government chooses lm  to maximize the output of the entire 
economy after the imposition of taxes and the disbursement of subsidies. With free labor 
mobility, all the skilled workers will work in the city, by the assumption that the returns 
to their skills are higher in the city. Thus, the total income of the whole economy (before 
the government’s imposition of taxes and disbursement of subsidies) is given by (9). Note 
that the total income after the government’s redistribution is the same as the total income 
before the government’s intervention. Therefore, the government will choose lm to 
maximize the total output of the whole economy (before the government’s tax and 
subsidy), that is, it will choose *mml   (recall the analysis in Section 3.1). Then, by 
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inserting *mml   into (14) and (15) and solving these two simultaneous equations, we 
obtain the optimal subsidy ( * ) and the optimal tax ( * ) as follows: 
rrcc
r
lssl
ml
f
g


)(
]
)0(
1[
*
*
 (16)
and
rrcc
rcc
lssl
mssl
gf 

)(
)(
)]0([
*
*

  . (17)
It is easy to ascertain that the tax rate in the city, * , is between zero and one and that the 
amount of subsidy per rural unskilled worker, * , is between zero and )0(gf  . In 
summary, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4: 
(1) The subsidy to the rural sector can lead to a Pareto improvement for both the 
urban and rural dwellers, which unambiguously improves social welfare.
(2) The optimal tax and the optimal subsidy given, respectively, by (16) and (17), 
yield an equilibrium number of unskilled migrants that maximizes the output of 
the whole economy.
The underlying logic of Proposition 4 is similar to that of Section 3. The subsidy 
to the rural sector effectively restricts rural-to-urban migration, which in turn mitigates 
the inefficient allocation of the average level of human capital between the rural and 
urban areas.
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4.2. Governmental expenditures on education 
In this subsection, we denote the total number of skilled, which is now a variable, 
by s. In this new setting we denote by ul  the initial number of unskilled workers in the 
city (before migration occurs) and by m  the number of the unskilled rural-to-urban 
migrants.
We consider the realistic, developing world situation that there will still be 
unskilled in the rural area, no matter how much the government spends on education (up 
to a realistic amount). Then, with free labor mobility in equilibrium, the following 
condition for the urban and rural wage equalization must obtain:
)0(),( g
msl
s
mslf
u
u 

 . (18)
Thus, from (18), we can see that with free labor mobility, an increase in educational 
expenditures will not increase the wage rates for the skilled workers and the unskilled 
workers in both the rural and the urban areas. Namely, no matter how large s is (up to a 
certain level so that there are still unskilled workers in the rural area), the wage rate for 
the unskilled workers and the skilled workers will remain constant at the levels of g(0) 
and g(0), respectively.
Now, we denote the fraction of skilled workers in the city by R, namely
msl
s
R
u 
  . (19)
It implies that 
s
R
s
msl u )1(    . (20)
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Inserting (19) and (20) into (18), we get
)0(],)1([ gRs
R
s
f    . (21)
Totally differentiating (21) with respect to s and R, we get
2
2
1
1
2 ])1([
fRsf
fRR
ds
dR

   . (22)
Recall that 1. Then, from (22), we can see that 0
ds
dR
; that is, an increase in the total 
number of skilled workers will result in a lower fraction of skilled workers in the city if 
and only if
2
2
1 fRsf  (23)
namely, if and only if 
21
2)( sffmsl u  . (24)
In summary, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 5: 
(1) With free labor mobility, an increase in governmental expenditures on education 
will not increase the wage rates for skilled or unskilled workers in both the rural 
and urban areas.
(2) An increase in the total number of skilled workers will result in a lower fraction 
of skilled workers in the city if and only if 21
2)( sffmsl u  .
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The model shows that without restrictions of (deterrence to) rural-to-urban 
migration, a government’s effort to increase educational expenditures and thereby the 
number of skilled workers will not increase the wage rates in the rural and urban areas as 
long as a large number of unskilled workers remain in the rural area in equilibrium. Thus, 
as the number of skilled workers (in the city) increases, the average human capital in the 
city may decrease. Note that the intuition of Part (2) of Proposition 5 is that an increase 
in s may result in a much greater increase in m , which reduces R. If the economic 
prosperity of a city depends on its average human capital, as emphasized, for example, by 
Lucas (2001), then a rather surprising outcome is that larger expenditures on education 
will result in a lower level of average human capital in the city and the same level of 
average human capital in the countryside, which will thus reduce the economic prosperity 
of the entire economy. Therefore, the proposition implies that increasing educational 
expenditures alone in a developing country may yield an inefficient outcome. In other 
words, in a developing country where unskilled workers far outnumber skilled workers, 
increasing the human capital stock will not in and by itself reverse the inefficient
allocation of the average human capital between the rural and urban areas that is caused, 
in turn, by unrestricted rural-to-urban migration. Consequently, increasing the human 
capital stock alone may not result in the country’s workers experiencing an increase in
their wage rates.
An additional comment is called for. Suppose that the government can freely 
decide on its educational expenditures in the rural and urban areas. Then, with free rural-
to-urban migration, the government will incur educational expenditures only in the city if 
the educational system in the city is more efficient than in the countryside. This is so 
because with free labor mobility, all the skilled workers will end up in the city. With a 
restriction on rural-to-urban migration, however, the government will have a stronger 
incentive to spend on rural education since it can increase rural wages and reduce the 
migration of the unskilled workers to the city, which, as analyzed in Section 3, will, in 
turn increase everyone’s wage rate.
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5. Robustness of the Model
The analysis in the preceding sections yields several new results, some of which 
are in sharp contrast to the received literature. Since our analysis is based on a simple 
foundation, one may wonder whether our results depend critically on our underlying 
assumptions. In response to this possible concern we discuss in this section the robustness 
of our results. We show that the fundamental assumption of our model is that there is an 
abundant supply of unskilled labor in the rural areas, an assumption which is in line with 
the prevailing reality in most developing countries.16 We argue that the results obtained 
thus far will qualitatively hold even if our model is extended. We consider six extensions: 
(1) capital is yet another factor of production, (2) there are several cities, (3) individuals 
may have idiosyncratic tastes for living in the countryside, (4) there is a congestion cost 
in the city, (5) the marginal productivity of unskilled labor in the rural sector is 
diminishing and (6) housing prices and rents in the urban areas are higher than in the 
rural areas.
In our model, we have assumed that labor is the only factor of production and that 
skilled labor and unskilled labor are substitutes in production. If, instead, we were to 
assume that capital too is a factor of production and that skilled and unskilled labor are 
complements in production, then, ceteris paribus, the returns to capital and skilled labor 
in the city will increase with increased rural-to-urban migration of unskilled labor. 
However, the returns to both capital and skilled labor also depend on the average level of 
human capital in the city, which declines with the increase in the inflow of unskilled 
labor. The net returns to capital and skilled labor in response to an increase in the rural-
to-urban migration of unskilled labor will depend then on the magnitude of the negative 
impact on productivity of a declining average level of human capital. In other words, the 
greater the impact of the average level of human capital on productivity, the more likely 
the net returns to capital and to skilled labor will decline with an increase in the rural-to-
urban migration of unskilled labor.
                                                
16 In fact, this assumption is similar to Ricardo’s (1817) argument that at the time of early industrialization 
in many of the now developed countries, there was always a “labor surplus” in the rural areas.
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In historical times, such as the period of the Industrial Revolution, production was 
not intensive in sophisticated knowledge, which suggests that the agglomeration effect in 
itself resulted in high productivity, with urbanization positioning the economy on a 
growth path (Goodfriend and McDermott 1995). 17  In that setting, rural-to-urban 
migration of unskilled labor benefited both capitalists and skilled labor (such as engineers 
and entrepreneurs). However, in the current era of knowledge-based production, the 
average level of human capital is a vital determinant of a city’s productivity. In this 
environment, unrestricted rural-to-urban migration is likely to lead to a significant 
reduction in the returns to all factors of production.
Consider next a setting of multiple cities. In such a setting, since the production 
functions in different cities are all likely to be non-linear, the general equilibrium 
framework of this new setting is likely to yield multiple equilibria. However, as long as 
there is a sufficiently abundant supply of unskilled labor in the rural areas, the result will 
continue to hold that in a developing country, the agglomeration effect does not bring 
about high production efficiency in a general equilibrium framework if labor mobility is 
free. The reason is that if the wage of the unskilled workers in any city is higher than the 
wage of the rural unskilled workers, then there will be an inflow of unskilled migrants 
from the rural area into that city that will result in a steadily declining level of average 
human capital in that city. In equilibrium there will be a complete equalization of the 
wage rate of the unskilled workers in the rural area and in that city, and the efficiency 
effect of urban agglomeration in that city will be completely diluted by the unrestricted 
rural-to-urban migration of unskilled workers. By a similar logic, the policy implications
of the model will also continue to hold.
To concentrate on essentials, our model does not incorporate the possibility that 
some individuals may have idiosyncratic tastes for living in the countryside, which could 
imply that some skilled individuals may choose to accept a lower rural wage in order to 
live in the countryside. In this case, not all the skilled workers will end up in the cities. 
However, it is reasonable to argue that particularly in a poor economy, for most people
                                                
17 In those times, manufacturing existed only in cities, and the rural areas produced only agricultural goods.
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this kind of idiosyncratic taste is not strong in comparison with the lure of a higher 
income. Thus, the essential implication of our model, that without government 
intervention too many of both the skilled workers and the unskilled workers are in the 
cities, will materially continue to hold. 
Also, in the received literature it is nearly always postulated that the limiting 
factor on migration to the cities is congestion (or commuting costs and pollution). This 
perspective can be conveniently incorporated into our model upon a slight modification 
of an assumption in (2): instead of 0),(1 hnf  for all n, we could assume that 
0),(1 hnf  if n is below a certain level and that 0),(1 hnf  if n is above a certain level. 
Clearly, such a modification will not qualitatively change any of the model’s results. As a 
matter of fact, this consideration implies that there is a negative externality effect of
rural-to-urban migration, which in turn implies that restricting rural-to-urban migration is 
even more desirable. In other words, the modification would only reinforce the 
ramifications of our model.
Next, it might be argued that the marginal productivity of unskilled labor in the 
rural sector diminishes and, hence, that additional rural-to-urban migration may increase
rural welfare. However, since there are at least two factors of production in the rural 
sector viz. skilled labor and unskilled labor, these two factors are likely to be 
complementary in production, and thus, an increase in skilled labor in the rural sector will 
increase the marginal productivity of unskilled labor in that sector. Consequently, 
restricting the rural-to-urban migration of skilled labor will increase the marginal 
productivity of unskilled labor in the rural sector and thereby could well increase welfare
in that sector. In other words, a more efficient way of allocating labor might be to induce 
some skilled labor to work in the rural sector, rather than encouraging additional rural-to-
urban migration of unskilled labor.
Finally, it could be argued that agglomeration in the cities will bring in its wake 
high housing prices that could drive unskilled labor out of the cities. However, this 
argument is inconsistent with the observed reality in most developing countries. Large 
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segments of the cities of the developing world consist of shanty towns and poor 
neighborhoods in which the price of housing is very low, even though the price of 
housing in other parts of the cities can be as high as that in the cities of the developed 
world (cf. Todaro). At least two explanations account for this. First, the presence of a 
large number of unskilled workers in a certain part of a city can well result in a low 
housing price in that part of the city, for example, due to concerns about crime and 
pollution. Second, a great many of the unskilled workers who migrate to the cities in the 
developing world leave their families behind. These migrants typically send much (often 
most) of their (meager) earnings to their families in the rural areas, and their demand for 
housing in the cities is usually quite modest. The shanty towns and poor neighborhoods 
in the cities evolve so as to offer low-quality, cheap, and small housing units to cater for 
this demand.
In conclusion, the results obtained in our simple model appear to be robust to an 
array of possible extensions, as long as the assumption that there is a sufficiently 
abundant supply of unskilled labor in the rural areas holds.18 Since this assumption is in 
line with the prevailing reality of most developing countries but may not be reflective of 
the conditions that obtain in the developed world, we re-emphasize that our model applies 
only to developing countries.
6. Conclusions
Somewhat surprisingly, the received theoretical literature hardly attends to the
subject of rural-to-urban migration in developing countries in modern times. As noted in 
the Introduction, this neglect appears to stem from two interrelated misconceptions: that 
rural areas produce only agricultural goods, and that the efficient production of 
manufactured goods can take place only in (large) cities.19 Presumably, it is because of 
                                                
18 Recall that this assumption is represented by Inequality (8) when there are no restrictions on labor 
mobility, and when there are no government interventions.
19 In fact, manufacturing activities have become more decentralized even in developed countries such as the 
USA (Desmet and Fafchamps 2006).
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these misperceptions that the role of human capital in the production of the rural sector is 
largely ignored in the received theoretical literature.
We have sought to set up a new framework that bridges the gap. We postulate that a 
city’s productivity is determined by its average level of human capital and by the size of 
its labor force. The productivity of the rural area is determined by the average level of 
human capital there. Our analysis yields a rather surprising implication: unrestricted 
rural-to-urban migration reduces the average income of both rural and urban dwellers in 
equilibrium. With free inter-area labor mobility, rural-to-urban migration will come to a 
halt when the urban and rural wages for unskilled workers are equalized: the urban wage 
will fall continuously with the in-migration of unskilled workers, which reduces the 
average level of human capital in the city. Furthermore, since the wages of skilled and 
unskilled workers in the urban area are affected by common productivity factors, the 
wage of the skilled workers will be driven to a low level by the unrestricted rural-to-
urban migration. Thus, our analysis explains the negative consequences of rural-to-urban 
migration in the developing world. Moreover, our analysis yields several interesting 
policy insights: the analysis reveals that measures aimed at curtailing rural-to-urban 
migration by both unskilled and skilled workers can potentially lead to a Pareto 
improvement for both the urban and rural dwellers, and it shows that without restrictions
on rural-to-urban migration, increasing educational expenditures alone may not increase 
the wage rates in the rural or urban areas.
Models of rural-to-urban migration are at the heart of theories of economic 
development and growth. Ricardo argued that the urban industrial sector can draw away 
surplus rural labor without causing a rise in wages in either the rural or urban areas. 
Ricardo’s insight was expanded in numerous subsequent writings, including the Nobel-
Prize winning treatise of Lewis (1955) and the seminal contribution of Fei and Ranis 
(1964). This body of work explains nicely the historical demographic transition across 
regions as well as the economic development of the currently-developed countries. 
Recently, Lucas (2004) has revitalized Ricardo’s original insight and developed it further, 
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noting that rural-to-urban migration is essentially a process of the transfer of labor from a 
traditional, land-intensive technology to a human capital-intensive technology.
Despite its prominence in the development economics literature, the current body 
of research runs into great difficulties in explaining the consequences of the massive 
rural-to-urban migration flows that have occurred in a great many developing countries in 
the past few decades. Our theory explains the different impacts of rural-to-urban 
migration in the past versus nowadays. We posit that the production efficiency of a city 
depends not only on the size of its labor force (the agglomeration effect), but also on the 
average level of human capital of its labor force. In a general equilibrium framework, we 
demonstrate that unrestricted rural-to-urban migration leads to inefficiency when the 
average level of human capital plays a significant role in productivity, which might not 
have been the case in historical times. In the past, production was not knowledge
intensive, which suggests that it was the agglomeration effect in and by itself that resulted 
in high productivity, with urbanization placing the economy on a solid growth path. In 
the current era of knowledge-intensive production, the average level of human capital is a 
vital factor in the productivity of both the urban and rural areas. In this setting, 
unrestricted rural-to-urban migration in developing countries leads to significant negative 
outcomes for all individuals, in cities and countryside alike.
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